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STUDENT NoTES

country are replete with hasty and crude decisions; and such cases
ought to be examined without fear, and revised without reluctance,
rather than to have the character of our law impaired, and the beauty
and harmony of our system destroyed by the perpetuity of error." 1
Kent's Comm. 477.
Kentucky seems to line up with the majority of the states upon
the problem of the adequacy of damages for breach of a contract to
convey realty. Mills v. Metcalf, 8 Ky. 477, (1819); Flege v. Covington & Cincinnati Elevated R. R. and Bridge Co., 122 Ky. 348, 91 S. W.
738 (1906); McGee v. Bell, 3 Littell (13 Ky.) 190 (1823). However,
there are few cases in this state with direct language to this effect;
probably the case which best illustrates the view of the Kentucky
courts Is the case of Mills v. Metcalf, supra. In this case the plaintiff
filed a bill in equity with a double aspect of either gaining specific
execution or cancellation of contract for the sale of 1,600 acres of land.
The court held that although a complainant may maintain an action
at law for a breach of such a contract he may further, if he elects to
do so, resort to equity for specific execution of the contract. In the
principle case, however, it is quite evident that the court has departed
from the beaten path as set out in the majority of the cases, and to the
writer this view seems to be the better one.
In conclusion, it might be said, that in spite of the overwhelming
number of cases bearing out the so-called majority view, it cannot be
said that the status of contracts concerning the sale of land is definitely settled. Now, more than ever before, the courts of this country
seem to realize that they cannot support this rule, and at the same
time, line up with some of the basic principles of equity. From the
attitude taken by the court in some of the recent cases, it may be
safely predicted, that in the near future the courts will take a less arbitrary attitude toward this problem and refuse to grant relief by specific performance unless the plaintiff affirmatively shows that he has
no adequate relief in a court of law.
W. R. JoiNEs.
CRIMES--CNTEMPT nY PUBLIcATIo .- In a recent case the question
of summary punishment by the court for contempt by publication
again arises. Defendant was the publisher of the San Diego Herald, a
paper printed and circulated in San Diego, Cal. On March 13th, 1930,
this newspaper contained an article captioned as follows:
"New
Grand Jury Is Sweet Scented Bunch of Hollyhocks Designed to 'Protect
San Diego'. Judge Andrews Picked Them but Could Have Added
More. (By A. R. Sauer)"; and contained a lengthy article berating
the court and Its officers in the same vein. On March 20th, 1930, Judge
Andrews filed an affidavit for contempt and had the sheriff attach the
body of Sauer and bring him before the court. When the case came
to trial the accused filed an affidavit alleging the disqualification of the
respondent judge and made application to have the case transferred
to another department of the San Diego Superior Court. The applica-
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tion was denied and the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition from
this court. Held, determination of the contemptous nature of the context rests with the court offended but the respondent has no right to
pass on his own disqualification. This should be determined by another judge and until then respondent was restrained and prohibited
from any further proceedings in the matter. Sauer v. Andrews, Judge,
115 Cal. App. 272, p. 1 (2d) 997 (1931).
This case lines up with the modern weight of authority in that it
does not question the offended court's right to try the author of the
alleged contemptous publication but it does question the judge's right
to settle on his own qualifications. Decisions such as these, though not
repudiating the general principle, go a long way towards undermining
it.
The history of the punishment of contempt by publication has
been a single bitter struggle between the advocates of freedom of the
press and the proponents of the inviolability of the judiciary, with the
advantage being first on the one side and then on the other.
Contempts have been punished on two grounds; the tendency to
besmirch the dignity of the courts and, to obstruct the paths of justice. The courts have claimed either an inherent power from "time
immemorial" or a power derived from the constitution. Likewise
those advocates of the freedom of the press point to that constitutional
provision in the bill of rights and to the right guaranteed each citizen
of a trial by jury in criminal cases. The claims of the proponents
originate with the work of Blackstone in which he lists crimes which
may be proceeded against summarily, including "speaking and writing
contemptously of the court or judges acting in their official capacity,"
The process of
and "printing false accounts of pending causes ....
attachment for these and the like contempts must of necessity be as
A power therefore in the suancient as the laws themselves ....
preme courts of justice to suppress such contempts by an immediate
attachment of the offender results from the first principles of Judicial
establishments and must be an inseparable attendant upon every superior tribunal." 4 Bl. Comm., 284 et seq.
But Sir John Fox points out in "The History of Contempt of
Court," 19, 65 et seq., 101, 227 et seq., "that the learned commentator
neglected to inquire whether persons attached for contempt had formerly been tried by jury or to be inspired with mistrust by his inability to cite any case of attachment for publication." Ibid. 19.
Rather he based it on the draft of a "Judgment," never delivered, of his
friend Judge Wilmot. This was an abortive proceeding, responsive to
the political pressure of the times, to attach Almon, the bookseller, for
publishing a criticism of Lord Mansfield's conduct of proceedings
against John Wilkes. King v. A7mon, Wilmot's Op. 243, 254; Reg v.
LeFroy, L. R. 8 Q. B. 135 (1873).
But however authentic might be the source, It must be admitted
that England has followed this doctrine until the present. Regina v.
Wilkinson, 41 Q. B. 47 (1871); Felkin v. Herbert, 33 L. J. Chan. (N. S.)
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294 (1863); Reg v. Parnell,14 Cox, C. C. 474 (1880); Re, v. Olarke,
103 L. T. (N. S.) 636 (1910); and a long line of cases cited in 2 Brit.
Rul. Cas. 488-494. However, if the article is not of a particularly contemptous nature and publication is made without knowledge of the
pending trial, or when the case is no longer pending, the English
courts have refrained from use of their summary power. Metropolitan
Music Hall Co. v. Lake, 58 L. J. Ch. (N. S.) 513 (1889); Phillips v.
Hess, 181 T. L. R. 400 (1902); and other cases cited 2 Brit. Rul. Cas.
494.
Our own courts followed the strict rule of summary punishment
during the early days of our judicial development. Respublica v. Oswald, I Dali. 319 (Pa. 1788), is the first American case on contempt
by publication. Hollingsworth v. Duane, Wall. C. C. 77 (Pa. Fed. 1801).
But a people so recently freed from the imagined oppression of Britain
were not long to submit to the despotic power of the judiciary. The
antagonism created by the decisions on these two Pennsylvania cases
burst Into flame after the -summary punishment, by the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania, of editor Passmore, Bayard & Petit v. Passmore,
3 Yeates 439 (Pa. 1802). Articles for impeachment of the justices
were drawn up in the lower house by vote of 57-24, but In the Senate
the vote was two short of the necessary two-thirds for impeachment,
13-11. In 1809 Pennsylvania enacted the first American legislation on
the subject, confining the summary power of the court to: (1) official
misconduct of court officers; (2) disobedience of process; (3) misbehavioure in the actual presence of the court, actually obstructing
the administration of justice; and (4) expressly prohibited summary
punishment for any publication. 1809 Pa. Acts, c. 78, p. 146. The Act,
originally experimental, was made permanent by the Act of June 16,
1836, Pa. L. see. 23 et seq. It 'now appears with unimportant modifications in the 1920 Dig. Pa. Stat. L. sees. 5484-5488. Pennsylvania
courts, with an occasional recurrence in their dicta of the doctrine of
summary punishment, Hummell v. Bishoff, 9 Watts 416 (Pa. 1840),
have adhered strictly to the statutory limitation.
Following the adjustment in Pennsylvania, a controversy broke
out in New York. Chancellor (then Justice) Kent had broadly asserted, but moderately applied, the power of summary punishment in
the case of "People v. Freer, 1 Caines 485 (N. Y. 1803). But the case
which so greatly Incensed the critics was the denial of habeas corpus
to the defendaint in the contempt case of Yates, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 316
(1809). On appeal it was reversed and Yates discharged. About this
time Livingston's "System of Penal Law Prepared for the State of
Louisiana," began to attract world-wide attention. In this Livingston
proposed to completely deprive the courts of their power of summary
punishment for any and all contempts, submitting that contemnors as
in all other criminal cases should be punishable by the State, only
on conviction by jury.
Whatever may have been the deciding factor, the legislature of
1829 drastically curtailed the power of summary punishment, limiting
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it to certain specified crimes and no more, Including "the publication
of a false and grossly inaccurate report of its proceedings; but no court
shall have the power to punish, as for a criminal contempt, the publication of true, full and fair reports of any trial, argument, proceedings or decision had In such courts." 1829 Rev. StAt. Part 3, Ch. 3,
Tit. 2, Art. 1, sec. 10. These provisions are still in force in New York
Jud. Law, secs. 750-753, Penal Law, sec. 600. They have been conIstrued in the spirit of their enactment. Rutherford v. Holmes, 5 Hun
317 (1875); aff'd, 66 N. Y. 367 (1876); People ex rel. Barnes v. Court
of Sessions, 147, N. Y. 290, 41 N. E. 700 (1895); People ex rel. Brewer
v. Platzelk, 133 App. Div. 25, 117 N. Y. Supp. 852 (1909).
Conditions, as they existed in our federal courts, were much the
same. The common law doctrine of summary punishment for contempt, insofar as it was not inconsistent with our constitution, was
followed, Ex parte Kearney, 7 Wheat. 38 (U. S. 1822); U. S. v. Hudson,
7 Cranch 32 (U. S. 1812) contains an intimation of the inherent "contempt" power and Anderson D. Dunn, 6 Wheat. 204 (U. S. 1821), in
which Johnson, J., said that the inherent power was not dependent
upon statutory authorization nor subject to statutory curtailment.
But in 1826 Judge Peck of the Federal District Court for the district of Missouri imprisoned and disbarred a lawyer, Luke Lawless,
for publishing a detailed criticism of an opinion while an appeal from
him was still pending. Lawless presented to Congress a petition for
his impeachment which passed the lower house and on his trial before
the Senate he was acquitted, but twenty-one out of forty-three senators
Stansbury, Report of the Trial of
pronounced him guilty (1831).
James H. Peck (Hilliard, Gray & Co., Boston, 1833); 37 Harv. L. Rev.
1024. One week after his acquittal a bill had passed both houses and
had been signed by the President, based on the Pennsylvania Act of
1809, supra, and the New York Act of 1829, supra, limiting the court's
power to attach and inflict summary punishment for contempt to the
following cases: Misbehaviour of "persons In presence of said court
or so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice; misbehaviour of any of the officers-and the disobedience of any officer-."
Act of March 2nd, 1831 Ch. 98; 4 Sta. 487. The law is still on our
books-U. S. Code (1926) § 385 (Jud.) and U. S. Code § 241 (CrIm.).
By 1860 twenty-three of the thirty-three states had enacted statutes limiting the power of summary punishment for contempt, 28 Col.
L. Rev. 533 n. 30.
Between 1831 and the Civil War only seven cases were found
which raised the question of contempt by publication. In five of them
it was held that the court had no power to punish for the publication
'in question. Bx parte Poulson, Fed. Case No. 11, 350, (1835); Stewart
v. People 3 Scam. 395 (Ill. 1842); Ex parte Hickey, 4 Smed. & Mars.
751 (Miss. 1844); Dunham v. State, 6 Ia. 245 (1858); Byron v. Calkins
(Wis. 1854) unreported but summarized in ex rel. Ashbaugh v. Eau
Claire, 97 Wis. 1, 72 N. W. 193 (1897).
In two states publications were held summarily punishable. Ten-
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ley's Case, 23 N. H. 162 (1851), held that the publisher and circulator
of a handbill tending to obstruct the administration of justice was
subject to summary punishment. The court relied on Blackstone and
the authorities prior to 1831, completely disregarding the decisions and
statutes of the other states since that time.
The Arkansas case of State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 (1853), was
more daring. The court punished summarily the publisher of an
article alleging that the Supreme Court had been bribed, holding, in
regard to the Act of 1838, Dig. Ch. 36 sec. 1, that inasmuch as It sanctioned summary punishment it was merely declaratory of the power
of the courts derived from the constitution and in accord with common law. Inasmuch as it prohibited, it was merely indicative of the
legislature's opinion, and as such was entitled to respect but was not
binding on the courts, who, as the legislature, derive their power from
the constitution. "The legislature may regulate the exercise of, but
cannot abridge the express or necessarily implied powers granted to
The right to punish for contempt,
this court by the Constitution ....
in a summary manner, has long been admitted as inherent in all
courts of justice."
This outright repudiation of the doctrine of curtailment of the
summary power rapidly gained followers. Few other, if any, Arkansas
cases have been so widely cited. The courts of State after State have
followed Arkansas in revival of the repudiated doctrine until that
revival has swept practically all American jurisdictions. By 1903 the
courts of fifteen other states had aligned themselves with the reactionary doctrine of New Hampshire and Arkansas. The leading cases
were: People v. Wilson, 64 Ill. 195 (1872); State v. Frew, 24 W. Va.
416 (1884); Myers v. State, 46 Ohio St. 473, 22 N. E. 43 (1889); In re
Chadwick, 109 Mich. 588, 67 N. W. 1071 (1896); Telegram Newspaper
Co. v. Comn., 172 Mass. 294, 52 N. E. 445 (1899); Globe Newspaper Co.
v. Comm., 188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682 (1905); State ex inf. Grow v.
Shepherd, 177 Mo. 205, 76 S. W. 79 (1903).
The Federal Courts were slower to return to the Blackstonian doctrine but in 1915 Judge Killits of the Northern District of Ohio punished the "Toledo News-Bee" for articles and cartoons strongly intimating a bias on his part in favor of Traction interests in a pending
13uit to enjoin enforcement of a city ordinance imposing drastic conditions upon their continued use of the streets after expiration of the
franchises. U. S. v. Toledo Newspaper Co., 220 Fed. 458 (1915). He
was sustained by the Supreme Court of the United States, 247 U. S.
Justice Holmes with caustic irony, dis402, 38 Sup. Ct. 560 (1918).
senting: "But a judge of the United States is expected to -be a man
of ordinary firmness of character and I find it impossible to believe
that such a judge could have found in anything that was printed even
a tendency to prevent his performing his sworn duty."
In spite of Justice Holmes' vigorous dissent, in which Justice
Brandeis concurred, the case has been followed in the Federal courts
since. In re Independent Publishing Co., 240 Fed. 849 (1917); U. S. v.
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Providence Tribune Co., 241 Fed. 524 (1917); U. S. v. Markevtch, 261
Fed. 537 (1919); U. S. v. Sanders, 290 Fed. 428 (1923); Francis v.
People of the Virgin Xslantu, 11 F. (2d) 860 (1926).
Since the reassertion by Federal judges of the power of summary
punishment as to publication, all of the states but six have sanctioned
It. Cases so holding will be found in 6 3rd. Dec. Dig. pp. 959-962 and
Current Digests Contempt, Secs. 8 and 9.
An Indiana court in Dale v. State, 198 Ind. 110, 150 N. E. 781,
49 A. L. R. 647 (1926), best states the overwhelming weight of authority in regard to contempts and the reasons therefor. "Any contempt of court, whether it be direct or constructive, which makes an
attack upon the integrity of the court or an attack upon its officers,
which attack, hinders and delays the operation of the court with a
case or cases then pending in the court, which act is in disrespect of
the court, or tends to obstruct the administration of justice by the
court, or which tends to bring the court into disrespect, is a criminal
contempt, and is subject to punishment .... An alleged contempt
which is not in the immediate presence of the court is a constructive
contempt, and must be presented to the court for its action, upon the
Information of some one who knows of the contemptous action." See
also: 6 R. C. L. 531; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 148; 5 R. C. L. Supp. 352; 6 R.
C. L. Supp. 395.--"An act of the legislature which attempts to give
power to a constitutional court to recognize contempts against it and
to punish the contemnors is not a declaration of any new power but
merely a recognition of that broad power which the courts have had
)since their inception." 6 R. C. L. 524; 2 R. C. L. Supp. 146. "Contempts of court are dealt with by the court and judge against whom
they are directed .... A criminal contempt of court is not within
the operation of a statute providing for a change of venue in criminal
cases." 4 R. C. I. Supp. 423; the "constitutional guaranty of freedom
of the press is not infringed by summary procedure for contempt of
court, and a conviction thereunder, based upon publications which
tend to obstruct the administration of justice." 5 R. C. L. 510; 2 R.
C. L. Supp. 140; 6 R. C. I. Supp. 393
The Indiana court goes on to hold that neither a denial of intent
by verified answer, nor proof of the truth of facts alleged in published
articles, will constitute such justification as will purge one of the
charge.
There are strong principles in support of the majority view as
expressed by this case. The courts claim an inherent power to exercise and enforce the common law. They hold that this power is delegated to the judiciary by the Constitution and that legislation, insofar
as it seeks to deprive the courts of this power, is worthy of respect
merely as the opinion of a co-ordinate branch of the government, deriving its powers, as with the judiciary, from the Constitution; that
although freedom of the press is a Constitutional guaranty, yet so Is
man's right to a fair trial by a free and impartial jury; that when
publishers hinder the administration of justice by disqualifying many
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for jury service, poisoning the minds of jurors serving and .bringing
the courts into disrespect, they are turning a constitutional right into
criminal license.
Only four states have definitely repudiated this "inherent power"
of the courts to summarily attach and punish their contemnors. This
has been done by statute: Pennsylvania in 1809; New York in 1829;
and Kentucky and South Carolina in 1829 and 1813, respectively.
Kentucky Statutes do not define contempt but Ky. Stat. (Carroll,
1930) § 1291 provides: "A court shall not, for contempt, impose upon
the offender a fine exceeding thirty dollars or imprison him exceeding
thirty hours, without the intravention of jury." And in regard to
publications, section 1295, provides "No court or judge shall proceed
by process of contempt or impose a fine against any person who shall,
by words or writing, animadvert upon or examine into proceedings or
conduct of such judge or court, by words spoken or writing published
not in the presence of such court or judge in the court-house during
the sitting of the court" (1893, c. 182, p. 756, Sec. 165).
The constitutionality of this statute was questioned in the case
of in re Wooley, 11 Bush 95 (Ky. 1875). There the court relied somewhat upon the authority of State v. Morrell, supra but in Arnold v.
Commonwealth, 80 Ky. 300 (1882), the court affirmed the right of the
legislature to regulate the court's power to punish. The constitutionality of the statute now is definitely established; Talbott v. Commonwealth, 207 Ky. 749, 270 S. W. 32, (1925).
South Carolina's Code of Civil Procedure (1932) section 339 provides that "no citizen of this State shall be sent to jail for any contempt of court, or supposed contempt of court, committed during the
sitting of the court, and in disturbance of the court until he be brought
before the court, and there be heard by himself or counsel or shall
stand mute." (S. C. Acts, of 1731 and 1813). The courts have adhered
to this limitation.
The rules in force in these jurisdictions must be gleaned from the
statutes themselves for there have been no reported cases of contempt
by publication since their passage. Although the language in each
statute varies, the general rule seems to be that offensive publications
are to be regarded merely as constructive contempts and as such punishable only after trial by jury.
Yet in these four states we certainly find no decadent judiciary,
weakened by the attacks of contemnors. Justice is freely administered, its cause not unduly hampered or prejudiced, the dignity of the
courts not besmirched, though they have dared proceed without that
strong arm of protection, "summary power."
Though it is admitted that in many instances "trial by newspaper"
is an unmitigated evil and as such deserving of rigorous punishment,
yet in the vast majority of cases it is not "trial by newspaper" which
Is punished but rather those publications which reflect upon the dignity, integrity and ability of the court, the offended court sitting as
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the sole arbiter. In only fifteen of the sixty cases examined did the
publication involve pending litigation. The remainder were punished
as reflecting upon the court.
The conclusion is almost inevitable that the courts employ this
weapon more often as a means of self-vindication than as a shield to
protect jurors and prospective jurors from that bias and prejudice
which prevent an impartial verdict. When used to this end "summary
power" has its usefulness. For this reason alone the wisdom of the
Btatutes of Pennsylvania, New York, South Carolina and Kentucky is
to be doubted. As a means of self-vindication its necessity permits
of grave doubts. It is difficult to see why our judiciary should be more
zealously guarded from the searchlight of criticism than the two other
branches of our government. But assuming the necessity of such
protection, why not allow the contemnor the right to be tried by a
court other than. the one offended. Are judges not human and subject
to human weaknesses?
The principal case seems to suggest that justice would be better
served were another judge to pass on the contemptous nature of the
publication.
ROBERT E. HATTON, JR.
CRIMES-FEDEAL CRImINAL Co2iuON LAw.-The doctrine of a federal criminal common law is inseparably linked with the rise and
fall of the Federalist party. The establishment of the Supreme
Court by the Judiciary Act of 1789 was looked upon with misgivings
and even alarm by the people at large, because of the potentiality of
the powers as yet undefined which the enactment granted to it, and
the possibility of its being used as an effective- instrument to increase
the centralization of the national government to the detriment of
states' rights in the hands of the party then in power which was bent
upon accomplishing this very thing. Every move of this body in the
first years of its existence was watched with jealous eye; every decision was greeted with a deluge of acrimonious criticism by the
Anti-Federalist leaders and press in their eagerness to protect undiminished the rights of the individual states. It was unfortunate that
at this time one of the chief sources of litigation was the subject of a
federal criminal common law.
The inclination of authority is that the Federal courts have no
common law jurisdiction whatever in criminal cases. U. S. v. Eaton,
144 U. S. 677 (1892); In Re Greene, 52 Fed. 104 (1892); U. S. v. Martin,
U. S. Y.
176 Fed. 110 (1910); U. S. v. GMadwell, 243 U. S. 476 (1917).
Smith, 6 Dana Abr. 718 (1792), is the earliest case which arose on
the subject. It answered the question in the affirmative. In the second
case in which the controversy was mooted U. S. v. Ravara, 2 Dallas
297 (1793), it was argued that the offence committed was not an offence at common law, nor made so by any positive law of the United
States, but it was not urged that unless defined by statute, it could not

